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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Timothy Charles Condon appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of
his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In the underlying case, Condon was arrested for driving under the influence on
December 1, 2010.

(38584 R., pp.3-4.)

At Condon's subsequent arraignment, the

magistrate set bail at $1 million. (38584 R., pp.7, 9.) Because Condon pleaded guilty to
a felony DUI in 2003, the state charged Condon with felony DUI as a second offense in
15 years. (38584 R., pp.12-15.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Condon pleaded guilty
to the felony DUI in exchange for the state not filing a persistent violator charge. (38584
1/10/2011 Tr., p.2, Ls.7-14; p.13, L.2-p.14, L.6.)
After the change of plea, Condon's counsel filed a motion for pre-trial release on
the basis that bond was excessive. (38584 R., pp.23-24.) At the hearing on the motion
on February 1, having already received the PSI, defense counsel withdrew the motion
and requested an earlier sentencing date, which was granted. (38584 R., pp.25-26; see
also 2/15/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-16.) The district court entered judgment against Condon
and sentenced him to ten years with five years fixed. (38584 R., pp.49-50; see also
2/15/2011 Tr., p.23, L.17 - p.26, L.5.) Condon filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence (R., pp.86-88), which the district court denied (R., pp.92-97).
appealed.

(38584 R., pp.35-36.)

Condon

In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals

affirmed both Condon's conviction and sentence, and the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.99-100.)

1

On September 13, 2011, Condon filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief
claiming that his counsel was ineffective, that his conviction was unlawful because he
was not indicted, and that his sentence was excessive. (R., pp.4-17.) The state moved
to dismiss Condon's petition on the ground that it failed to raise an issue of material fact.
(R., pp.101-11.) The district court, addressing each of Condon's claims, granted the
state's motion and summarily dismissed Condon's petition for post-conviction relief. (R.,
pp.140-55.) Condon filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.159-63.)

2

ISSUE
Condon states the issue on appeal as:
Condon's trial counsel filed a motion for his pre-trial release without
bail, on the grounds that bail was excessive, so that Condon could begin
alcohol treatment prior to sentencing. Counsel later withdrew the motion
and asked that sentencing be expedited. At sentencing, the district court
relied, in part, on Condon's failure to ever obtain or complete alcohol
treatment when it determined his unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed.
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed
Condon's claim that his counsel was ineffective in his handling of the issue
of Condon's excessive bail?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Condon failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT

Condon Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Condon raised issues of ineffective

assistance of counsel, being charged by information instead of an indictment, and
excessive sentence. (R., pp.4-17.) The state moved to dismiss Condon's petition on
the ground that it failed to raise an issue of material fact. (R., pp.101-11.) The district
court, addressing each of Condon's claims, granted the state's motion and summarily
dismissed Condon's petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.140-55.)

On appeal,

Condon argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to pursue his motion for pre-trial release on the ground of
excessive bail. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Application of the correct legal standards to
Condon's claim, however, shows no error ..

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Condon's Post-Conviction Petition
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a
4

new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P .3d at 802;
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

Generally, the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v.
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).

However, unlike other civil

complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P.
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth
the grounds upon which the application is based."

~

(citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative.

"To

withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicantbears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278,
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
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Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v.

State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001 )). The trial court is not required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts,
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.

1st (citing Stuart v.

State, 118 Idaho

865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

1st

On appeal, Condon argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim
that his counsel was ineffective "when he withdrew Condon's motion for excessive bail,
preventing Condon from obtaining the benefit of pre-sentencing alcohol treatment,
which might have induced the sentencing judge to impose a lesser sentence."
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was
objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760
P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).

To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate and "show
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Baldwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (citations omitted).
"[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those

6

decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation."

.!st

To establish prejudice, the petitioner

must show "a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different."

kl

Condon has failed to meet

this burden.
Condon argues that defense counsel was deficient because he filed and then
withdrew a motion for pre-trial release based on a claim that Condon's bail was
excessive.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-12.)

When a petitioner claims his counsel was

ineffective for failing to file or pursue a motion, "the district court may consider the
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266
P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).

Condon's motion for pre-trial release, based on

excessive bail and brought after he pleaded guilty, was unlikely to be successful. First,
because Condon had already pleaded guilty and lost the presumption of innocence, he
was no longer entitled to release on bail. I.C.R. 46. Second, after reviewing the case,
the district court found that the magistrate acted within its discretion when it set bail,
considering Condon's criminal record and the facts of the charge.

(R., p.152.) This

finding, that bail was not excessive but within the magistrate's discretion, significantly
undermines Condon's ground for requesting pre-trial release.

Finally, Condon's

purported motive for the motion, to get alcohol treatment for purposes of sentencing
mitigation, was moot before the hearing on the motion. As noted in the minutes from
that hearing, both the PSI and GAIN assessment were completed before the scheduled
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hearing. (38584 R., p.25.) Neither was positive, with both recommending confinement.
(See 38584 PSI, pp.17-18; 38584 GAIN, pp.4-5.)
The district court further found that defense counsel acted in his client's behalf
when it made the tactical decision to withdraw the motion for pre-trial release and
request an earlier sentencing date.
brief, pp.10-12.)

(R., p.152.) Condon disputes this.

(Appellant's

He has not, however, presented any evidence to overcome the

presumption that trial counsel's decision to withdraw the motion and request an
expedited sentencing was based on reasonable strategy and was instead "based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation," as he was required to do. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54, 177
P.3d at 367-68.

Condon has failed to show that his counsel's alleged deficient

performance was anything other -than a tactical decision.

"The constitutional

requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have
been tried better."

Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). That

Condon, in hindsight, would now make a different tactical decision does not make his
defense counsel objectively deficient for withdrawing a motion and expediting
sentencing.

See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) ("Rare are the

situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will
be limited to only one technique or approach") (citation and quotations omitted).
Even assuming counsel's failure to pursue the motion for pre-trial release
constitutes deficient performance, Condon has failed to show prejudice in counsel's
tactical decision to withdraw the motion and expedite sentencing. Condon claims that
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"the judge relied, in part, on Condon's failure to obtain or complete alcohol treatment
when it imposed the five-year fixed sentence." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Below, he also
speculated that "had his bail been set reasonably-or had he been release to treatment,
he could have shown the Court and his pre-sentence report that he was amendable to
treatment and receive a lighter sentence."

(R., p.120.)

This argument fails for two

reasons. First, the district court's concern was not that Condon failed to seek alcohol
treatment between his arrest and sentencing on the instant offense; it was that, over the
course of seven confirmed DUI convictions, Condon had never sought or completed
treatment for his alcohol addiction and, Condon claimed, only now, after the seventh
conviction, did he recognize that he had a problem that needed to be addressed.
(38584 2/15/2011 Tr., p.16, L.23-p.18, L.11.) Second, speculation does not establish
prejudice. "It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding."

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787.

Rather, the petitioner must

show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different. ~
Condon's argument that counsel's purported deficient performance affected the
ultimate outcome of the proceedings, in this case his sentence, requires a long chain of
assumptions. At a minimum, the Court must assume that the motion for release would
have been successful and Condon would have been released after he had already
pleaded guilty to the crime, while pending sentencing on the felony, where he was a
repeat offender. The Court must next assume that Condon would have been accepted
into treatment.

The Court must then assume that Condon, despite his documented

history of alcohol abuse and alcohol-related crimes, would have been successful in
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treatment.

Finally, the Court must assume that this temporary success in treatment,

lasting at most a couple months before his sentencing hearing, would have resulted in
the district court imposing a lesser sentence, despite Condon's lengthy history of driving
while intoxicated (see 38584 PSI, pp.3-11), and despite defense counsel requesting the
sentence ultimately imposed (ten years with five years fixed), albeit with an initial period
of retained jurisdiction (see 38584 2/15/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-12).
A chain of assumptions is not evidence.

As noted above, without evidentiary

support, a post-conviction claim is subject to summary dismissal. Payne, 146 Idaho at
561, 199 P.3d at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903). Because Condon failed to show that his
counsel's tactical decision of withdrawing his motion for pre-trial release and requesting
expedited sentencing was objectively deficient, summary dismissal was appropriate.
Because Condon failed to present evidence of prejudice, summary dismissal was
appropriate. Condon has therefore failed to show error in the district court's summary
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Condon's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 20th day of May, 2013.

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of May, 2013, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
REBEKAH A. CUlE
Attorney At Law
P.O. Box 1983
Boise, ID 83701

c
~
Rl.JSLJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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